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 Admission of expert testimony is within the sole discretion of the trial judge. Abuse of 
discretion does not exist where defense counsel waited until the eighth day of trial to seek to call 
a newly-named expert witness without sufficient justification for the delay.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court adopts the rule against admission of witness and prosecution comments regarding 
a defendant’s invocation of Fourth Amendment rights when such evidence is used to support an 
inference of guilt.  When the district court admits such evidence, this Court will determine the 
existence of reversible error by application of the same test used for admission of such evidence 
regarding the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights.  Reversible error does not exist where a 
witness makes comments without being solicited as to the specific details of the invocation and 




 Judgment of conviction affirmed.  First, the district court did not err in refusing to admit 
the testimony of a new expert witness eight days into trial.  Next, the district court’s admission of 
a witness’s testimony regarding the defendant’s invocation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights was harmless error because the testimony was made in passing.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Defendant Willie Sampson was accused of sexually victimizing a 9-year-old boy 
pursuant to picking the boy up at a bus stop and taking him to McDonald’s.  The boy testified to 
the following sequence of events: Sampson picked him up on the street and bought the boy food 
from McDonald’s; after eating at Sampson’s house, Sampson pointed a gun at the boy and told 
him to do whatever Sampson said; Sampson ordered the boy to strip; Sampson covered the boy’s 
eyes with a white cloth and ordered the boy into the bathtub to “wash up good”; Sampson got 
into the bathtub facing the boy and touched and washed the boy’s buttocks and genitals; 
Sampson then ordered the boy to lay down on his back on a bed; Sampson rubbed lotion on and 
laid underneath the boy; Sampson placed the boy’s hand on Sampson’s penis and ordered the 
boy to masturbate him; when the boy refused, Sampson forced the boy to masturbate him until 
Sampson ejaculated; Sampson placed his penis near the boy’s mouth and repeatedly demanded 
oral sex; the boy refused; Sampson then gave the boy a pair of Sampson’s silver boxer shorts and 
a tee shirt; Sampson allowed the boy to watch television; when the boy asked Sampson for chips, 
Sampson compiled a grocery list of items the boy requested, tied the boy to a chair, and left the 
apartment to go to the store; and finally the boy freed himself and returned to his home.   
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 On cross-examination, inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony during trial, his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing, and the recorded statement he gave police following the 
incident were revealed.   
 
 Sampson testified at trial, and his version of events differed greatly from the boy’s.  
Essentially, Sampson testified that the boy motioned to him to stop his car, asked him for a ride 
to McDonald’s, and asked to come to Sampson’s home when Sampson informed him that he had 
to go home and work.  Sampson claimed that after eating, he asked the boy to call home, but the 
boy refused, that he offered to wash the boy’s clothes at a neighbor’s house because the boy 
smelled dirty and his clothes were filthy, that the boy took a bath alone, that he gave the boy 
some of his clothes to wear while the boy’s clothes were being washed, and that the boy noticed 
a chair with ropes on it that Sampson used for sexual activities with a female acquaintance and 
played with it until Sampson told him to leave it alone.  He denied ever attempting to have sex 
with the boy or touching him in any way.   
 
 On the eighth day of trial, Sampson sought to introduce the boy’s school records and an 
expert witness, Dr. Racoma.  Both identified the boy as having a diagnosis of Oppositional 
Defiant Disorder (ODD), an illness that is characterized by lying.  Sampson sought to allege that 
the boy had lied about the alleged abduction and molestation.  The court denied both requests. 
 
 During trial, two officers testified that they spoke with Sampson at the crime scene to 
request permission to conduct an unwarranted search but that Sampson denied this request.  A 
different officer testified that he did not speak with Sampson at the crime scene because 
Sampson was already in a patrol car and had requested an attorney.  Although defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial at this point, the court denied the motion.   
 
Sampson now appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence of multiple life terms, 
entered after jury verdict, for one count of first-degree kidnapping, two counts of lewdness with 
a minor, one count of attempted sexual assault on a minor under the age of fourteen, and one 
count of sexual assault on a minor under the age of fourteen.  Sampson argues that this Court 
should reverse his conviction on the grounds that the district court did not allow him to introduce 
his expert witness and that the State’s witnesses commented on his invocation of Fourth and 




Exclusion of Expert Testimony 
 Sampson’s first argument on appeal is that the district court erred by refusing to allow 
him to call Dr. Racoma to testify about the boy’s behavioral disorder.  As the admission of 
expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, the Supreme Court reviews 
the court’s decision for abuse of discretion only.2  When making such a determination, the Court 
remains cognizant of the defendant’s constitutional right to discredit his accuser.3  While there is 
                                                 
2 Brown v. State, 110 Nev. 846, 852, 877 P.2d 1071, 1075 (1994); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 572, 688 P.2d 326, 
327 (1984).   
3 Reese v. State, 458 A.2d 492, 496 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983). 
a strong presumption favoring the admission of even late-disclosed witnesses,4 the Court must be 
sure neither to waste judicial time nor to permit attacks on character unrelated to credibility.5  
 Nevada statutory law mandates that defense counsel and counsel for the state submit to 
the court and serve on opposing counsel written notice of all witnesses that each intends to call at 
least 5 days prior to trial.  Counsel must submit and serve 21 days before trial a list of expert 
witnesses that each intends to call.6  The court may choose among various penalties for a 
violation of these rules, including “prohibit[ing] the party from introducing in evidence the 
material not disclosed.”7   
 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sampson’s request for 
admission.  Although defense counsel was unable to ascertain Dr. Racoma’s identity until the 
eighth day of trial because of a misspelling in the boy’s school records, defense counsel could 
have located Dr. Racoma based on the misspelled records.  Defense counsel could have obtained 
evidence of the ODD diagnosis by questioning the boy’s mother.  Additionally, admission would 
have resulted in unfair surprise for the prosecution.  It is defense counsel’s error, not the Court’s, 
for failing to submit evidence contained in the boy’s school records and failing to timely pursue 
testimony from Dr. Racoma.   
 
Testimony relating to Sampson’s invocation of Fourth Amendment rights 
 Sampson’s second argument on appeal is that the district court erred by admitting 
testimony by police officers regarding Sampson’s invocation of his Fourth Amendment right to 
refuse to consent to a warrantless search.  Because defense counsel failed to object to the 
testimony during trial, Sampson bears the burden of establishing that plain error affecting his 
substantial rights occurred.8 
 Today, this Court adopts the rule against admission of a defendant’s invocation of his or 
her Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search when used to support an 
inference of guilt.  This brings Nevada courts in line with those Circuit and state courts that have 
addressed the issue.9  It is improper to punish a defendant for asserting his or her constitutional 
rights.10  Just as defendants may invoke their Fifth Amendment rights to conceal evidence of 
wrongdoing,11 so may defendants invoke their Fourth Amendment rights.  However, this 
prohibition of comments on defendants’ exercise of Fourth Amendment rights does not apply 
when defendants put their compliance with a search into issue.   
 This Court shall measure whether reference to a defendant’s invocation of Fourth 
Amendment rights is harmless error by the same test used to determine whether reference to an 
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights requires reversal: reversal of conviction is not required if, 
“(1) at trial there was only a mere passing reference, without more, to an accused’s post-arrest 
silence, or (2) there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.”12  Here, there was not overwhelming 
                                                 
4 Farris v. State, 818 N.E.2d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
5 Reese, 458 A.2d at 497. 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.234(1)-(2) (2006). 
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.295(2) (2005).   
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (2006). 
9 See U.S. v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 249 (5th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. 
Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 205-08 (3d Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1978); Padgett v. 
State, 590 P.2d 432, 434 (Alaska 1979); Mackey v. State, 507 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).   
10 Thame, 846 P.2d at 206-07; Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1351. 
11 Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1351. 
12 Morris v. State, 112 Nev. 260, 913 P.2d 1264 (1996).   
evidence of guilt, but instead the conviction was based on the jury’s decision to assign greater 
credibility to the boy than to Sampson.  Thus, this decision addresses only what constitutes “a 
mere passing reference.”13 
 Although the admission of the officers’ testimony was error, it was a mere passing 
reference and thus does not mandate reversal.  The officers’ comments were made in response to 
inquiries concerning whether they spoke to Sampson and what he said to them.  The questioning 
was not aimed at bringing out his invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights.   
 
Testimony relating to Sampson’s invocation of Fifth Amendment rights 
 The test to determine whether a witness’s or a prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s 
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights is harmless error is whether: “(1) at trial there was only a 
mere passing reference, without more, to an accused’s post-arrest silence, or (2) there is 
overwhelming evidence of guilt.”14  The Court will more likely find reversible error where “the 
language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would 
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant’s [assertion of her Fifth 
Amendment rights].”15  To constitute reversible error, the comments must have been intended to 
draw a meaning from the silence.16  The court will view the comments in context, and will not 
undertake reversal lightly.17 
 Here, the officer’s comment was a mere passing reference and does not mandate reversal.  
He made the statement without solicitation by the prosecution and in the context of explaining 
what he did when he arrived at the scene and whether he made contact with Sampson at that 
time.  His comments were not intended to draw meaning from Sampson’s silence, and they were 




 The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Defendant Sampson to 
introduce a new expert witness eight days into trial because the delay was without good excuse, 
and it would have resulted in unfair surprise for the prosecution.  This Court adopts the rule 
against admission of comments regarding a defendant’s invocation of Fourth Amendment rights 
when such evidence is used to support an inference of guilt.  The district court did err in 
admitting witness testimony regarding Defendant Sampson’s invocation of his Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights, but all comments were made in mere passing reference and thus constitute 
harmless, irreversible error.  
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Knight v. State, 116 Nev. 140, 144, 993 P.2d 67, 71 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
16 Washington v. State, 112 Nev. 1054, 1060, 921 P.2d 1253, 1257 (1996).   
17 Knight, 116 Nev. at 145, 993 P.2d at 71.  
